The Cyber Deterrence Problem

The Cyber Deterrence Problem PDF Author: Aaron F. Brantly
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN: 1786615665
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 203

Book Description
The national security of the United States depends on a secure, reliable and resilient cyberspace. The inclusion of digital systems into every aspect of US national security has been underway since World War II and has increased with the proliferation of Internet-enabled devices. There is an increasing need to develop a robust deterrence framework within which the United States and its allies can dissuade would-be adversaries from engaging in various cyber activities. Yet despite a desire to deter adversaries, the problems associated with dissuasion remain complex, multifaceted, poorly understood and imprecisely specified. Challenges, including credibility, attribution, escalation and conflict management, remain ever-present and challenge the United States in its efforts to foster security in cyberspace. These challenges need to be addressed in a deliberate and multidisciplinary approach that combines political and technical realities to provide a robust set of policy options to decision makers. The Cyber Deterrence Problem brings together a multidisciplinary team of scholars with expertise in computer science, deterrence theory, cognitive psychology, intelligence studies and conflict management to analyze and develop a robust assessment of the necessary requirements and attributes for achieving deterrence in cyberspace. Beyond simply addressing the base challenges associated with deterrence, many of the chapters also propose strategies and tactics to enhance deterrence in cyberspace and emphasize conceptualizing how the United States deters adversaries.

The Cyber Deterrence Problem

The Cyber Deterrence Problem PDF Author: Aaron F. Brantly
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN: 1786615665
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 203

Book Description
The national security of the United States depends on a secure, reliable and resilient cyberspace. The inclusion of digital systems into every aspect of US national security has been underway since World War II and has increased with the proliferation of Internet-enabled devices. There is an increasing need to develop a robust deterrence framework within which the United States and its allies can dissuade would-be adversaries from engaging in various cyber activities. Yet despite a desire to deter adversaries, the problems associated with dissuasion remain complex, multifaceted, poorly understood and imprecisely specified. Challenges, including credibility, attribution, escalation and conflict management, remain ever-present and challenge the United States in its efforts to foster security in cyberspace. These challenges need to be addressed in a deliberate and multidisciplinary approach that combines political and technical realities to provide a robust set of policy options to decision makers. The Cyber Deterrence Problem brings together a multidisciplinary team of scholars with expertise in computer science, deterrence theory, cognitive psychology, intelligence studies and conflict management to analyze and develop a robust assessment of the necessary requirements and attributes for achieving deterrence in cyberspace. Beyond simply addressing the base challenges associated with deterrence, many of the chapters also propose strategies and tactics to enhance deterrence in cyberspace and emphasize conceptualizing how the United States deters adversaries.

Flexible Options for Cyber Deterrence - Terrorism, Problem of Attribution, Cyber Attack, Espionage, Defense, Nation State Peer Competitors, China Conflict, SCADA, Network Equipment

Flexible Options for Cyber Deterrence - Terrorism, Problem of Attribution, Cyber Attack, Espionage, Defense, Nation State Peer Competitors, China Conflict, SCADA, Network Equipment PDF Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781520771311
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 82

Book Description
This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This paper describes options for cyber deterrence to address both asymmetric threats from terrorists and the intimidation associated with nation-state peer competitors in the cyber domain. It presents recent National Security Strategy interests and demonstrates a lack of focus upon cyber infrastructure. The paper will examine challenges associated with legal aspects in the cyber domain as well as the issue of attribution. It will analyze terrorist and nation-state usage of cyberspace and potential threats aimed at the United States related to each. Finally, the paper concludes with several recommendations for tailored cyber deterrence focused on terrorists and peer nation-states. The idea of deterrence has existed since the beginning of humanity. Lawrence Freedman in his book Deterrence uses the biblical tale of Adam, Eve, and the forbidden fruit as an example of deterrence. Webster defines deterrence as "maintenance of military power for the purpose of discouraging attack." The threat of war has always been a tool used by leaders to influence foreign powers to avoid acts of aggression. Ultimately, deterrence became synonymous with American Cold War strategic thinking and foreign policy. Mutually assured destruction was a classic adoption of deterrence through punishment. However, deterrence through punishment requires the demonstration of offensive capabilities. The highly classified nature of the United States cyber-based offensive tools makes this approach unlikely. In addition, deterrence by punishment does not work without identification and attribution. Lastly, any assumption of rationality demonstrates the fallacy of Cold War deterrence applied to the cyber domain. Today's multi-polar world provides multiple threats aimed at the United States in the cyber domain. From cyber terrorists to sophisticated nation-states, adversaries are increasing their cyber capabilities on a daily basis. Some argue for an offensive cyber doctrine of preemption, but as demonstrated in Iraq, preemption can be destabilizing. Acts of war may justify an offensive response, but conventional or nuclear deterrence is more appropriate when attempting to deter aggression defined by war. Complicating cyberspace deterrence is the lack of attribution, no traditional constraints associated with rational behavior of extremists, and a deficient United States cyber national strategy. The next chapter of this paper reviews recent United States strategies and critical cyber infrastructure, attribution in the cyber domain, and cyber espionage. Chapter three provides analysis of cyber terrorism and nation-state operations in the cyber domain. Chapter four describes cyber deterrence recommendations aimed at countering terrorists as well as United States peer competitors. The final chapter presents conclusions. Contents * Biography * Introduction * Background * National Security Strategy and Critical Infrastructure * The Problem of Attribution * Privacy and Attribution * Espionage versus Cyber-attack * Analysis * Cyber Terrorism: Does it Exist? * Terrorist Tactics and the Internet * Nation State Peer Competitors * Recommendations * Cyber Deterrence of Terrorism * Peer Competitors and Cyber Deterrence * Diplomatic and Economic Engagement as a Cyber Deterrent Option * Cyber Defense, More than Passwords * Conclusion * Bibliography

Is Cyber Deterrence Possible?

Is Cyber Deterrence Possible? PDF Author: Timothy M. McKenzie
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781548455361
Category : Cyber intelligence (Computer security)
Languages : en
Pages : 32

Book Description
In recent years, the importance of operating in and protecting the cyber domain has gained much attention. As long as our nation relies on computer networks as a foundation for military and economic power, our national and economic security are at risk through the cyber domain. Cyber attacks on US industry and government systems severely impact our economy and ability to execute modern network-centric warfare. Our reliance on networked systems and the high costs associated with cyber attacks have led many leaders in the US government and Department of Defense to focus resources toward developing a strategy for deterring adversaries from attacking our networks in the first place. This effort has led to much debate about the question, is cyber deterrence possible? Deterrence in the cyber domain is drastically different and far more complicated than in other military domains (air, land, sea, and space). Cyber weapons and offensive cyber techniques are relatively inexpensive and easily obtained or developed. The number of adversary groups capable of attacking US networks is large, and our ability to deter each group will vary based on its motives and levels of risk tolerance. An effective cyber deterrence strategy must be multilayered and use all instruments of US national power. This paper discusses the difficulties of deterring unwanted cyber activities, provides some realistic expectations for a deterrence strategy, and offers proposals to help mitigate the problems.

Cyber Attacks, Attribution, and Deterrence

Cyber Attacks, Attribution, and Deterrence PDF Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781520637655
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72

Book Description
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the role of a defender's ability to attribute a cyber attack and its effect on deterrence. Conflict in cyberspace is constantly evolving and deterrence might provide stability and understanding of these conflicts. Because of the speed at which cyber attacks can occur and the rate at which they can spread, it is important to understand how countries using cyber weapons frame the problem. The method used in this paper is controlled comparison of three different cyber attacks: the 2007 attacks on Estonia, the Stuxnet attack on Iran, and the LulzSec attacks multiple targets in 2011. These three events bore the similarity that defenders could not immediately attribute the attack to an actor. This attribution problem influenced how the defenders responded to the problem. Upon further research, however, it became apparent that attribution was not the defenders' biggest problem in two of the three cases. Attribution may not always be immediately available through technical means, but eventually defenders had enough information on which to act. At this point, other problems arose, like escalating a cyber conflict with a far more powerful neighbor or determining how to respond without a cyber capability of one's own. These cases demonstrate attribution is a necessary but not sufficient cause for responding to a cyber attack and that defenders have many response options available, from technical defense of their networks to escalation of the conflict to kinetic military strikes. Additionally, cyber deterrence does not require the high levels of attribution that some theorists argue. Instead, a counterattack can rely on a lower level of attribution because the target is typically a known adversary and because the results from a cyber attack are generally much lower than the effects from a kinetic attack. Thus, because of the need for a state to respond to cyber attacks in kind and the lower attribution requirements, an offensive cyber capability is both necessary and useful.

Cyber Deterrence is Overrated

Cyber Deterrence is Overrated PDF Author: Matthias Schulze
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Book Description
Zusammenfassung: Proponents of active, offensive cyber operations argue that they could have a deterrent effect on potential cyber attackers. The latter would think twice about attacking if a digital counter-attack might be the consequence. The idea that offensive cyber capabilities should have a deterrent effect was one reason why the new US cyber doctrine was adopted in 2018. The same assumption is implicit in the debate about cyber counterattacks ("hack backs") in Germany. Yet these assessments are based on a superficial understanding of deterrence. Cyber deterrence by the threat of retaliation works differently than that of nuclear deterrence. Problems of attribution, displays of power, controllability and the credibility of digital capabilities increase the risk of deterrence failure. Thus, the German cyber security policy would be well advised to increase its "deterrence by denial", cyber security and the resilience of its systems

Strongpoint Cyber Deterrence

Strongpoint Cyber Deterrence PDF Author: James J. Torrence
Publisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1796084689
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 156

Book Description
This important U.S. strategic studies work seeks to develop a cyber deterrence strategy by drawing upon the hard-learned lessons of the past—specifically from Cold War deterrence theory and Cold War missile defense. Ultimately, a strongpoint defense is proposed along with a decentralized and further hardened critical infrastructure approach that continually exploits emergent innovation opportunities through investment in research. Dave Dilegge Editor-in-Chief Small Wars Journal

Cross-Domain Deterrence

Cross-Domain Deterrence PDF Author: Erik Gartzke
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019090867X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 384

Book Description
The complexity of the twenty-first century threat landscape contrasts markedly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear and conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside anti-satellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, and other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence (CDD) emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers and commanders confronted emerging threats to vital military systems in space and cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), and CDD poses serious problems in practice. In Cross-Domain Deterrence, Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay assess the theoretical relevance of CDD for the field of International Relations. As a general concept, CDD posits that how actors choose to deter affects the quality of the deterrence they achieve. Contributors to this volume include senior and junior scholars and national security practitioners. Their chapters probe the analytical utility of CDD by examining how differences across, and combinations of, different military and non-military instruments can affect choices and outcomes in coercive policy in historical and contemporary cases.

Cyber War versus Cyber Realities

Cyber War versus Cyber Realities PDF Author: Brandon Valeriano
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019020480X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 256

Book Description
In 2011, the United States government declared a cyber attack as equal to an act of war, punishable with conventional military means. Cyber operations, cyber crime, and other forms of cyber activities directed by one state against another are now considered part of the normal relations range of combat and conflict, and the rising fear of cyber conflict has brought about a reorientation of military affairs. What is the reality of this threat? Is it actual or inflated, fear or fact-based? Taking a bold stand against the mainstream wisdom, Valeriano and Maness argue that there is very little evidence that cyber war is, or is likely to become, a serious threat. Their claim is empirically grounded, involving a careful analysis of cyber incidents and disputes experienced by international states since 2001, and an examination of the processes leading to cyber conflict. As the authors convincingly show, cyber incidents are a little-used tactic, with low-level intensity and few to no long-term effects. As well, cyber incidents are motivated by the same dynamics that prompt regional conflicts. Based on this evidence, Valeriano and Maness lay out a set of policy recommendations for proper defense against cyber threats that is built on restraint and regionalism.

Congress on Intelligent Systems

Congress on Intelligent Systems PDF Author: Mukesh Saraswat
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 9811691134
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 914

Book Description
This book is a collection of selected papers presented at the Second Congress on Intelligent Systems (CIS 2021), organized by Soft Computing Research Society and CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru, India during September 4 – 5, 2021. It includes novel and innovative work from experts, practitioners, scientists and decision-makers from academia and industry. It covers topics such as Internet of Things, information security, embedded systems, real-time systems, cloud computing, big data analysis, quantum computing, automation systems, bio-inspired intelligence, cognitive systems, cyber physical systems, data analytics, data/web mining, data science, intelligence for security, intelligent decision making systems, intelligent information processing, intelligent transportation, artificial intelligence for machine vision, imaging sensors technology, image segmentation, convolutional neural network, image/video classification, soft computing for machine vision, pattern recognition, human computer interaction, robotic devices and systems, autonomous vehicles, intelligent control systems, human motor control, game playing, evolutionary algorithms, swarm optimization, neural network, deep learning, supervised learning, unsupervised learning, fuzzy logic, rough sets, computational optimization, and neuro fuzzy systems.

Optimizing Cyberdeterrence

Optimizing Cyberdeterrence PDF Author: Robert Mandel
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1626164142
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 304

Book Description
Cyberattacks are one of the greatest fears for governments and the private sector. The attacks come without warning and can be extremely costly and embarrassing. Robert Mandel offers a unique and comprehensive strategic vision for how governments, in partnership with the private sector, can deter cyberattacks from both nonstate and state actors. Cyberdeterrence must be different from conventional military or nuclear deterrence, which are mainly based on dissuading an attack by forcing the aggressor to face unacceptable costs. In the cyber realm, where attributing a specific attack to a specific actor is extremely difficult, conventional deterrence principles are not enough. Mandel argues that cyberdeterrence must alter a potential attacker’s decision calculus by not only raising costs for the attacker but also by limiting the prospects for gain. Cyberdeterrence must also involve indirect unorthodox restraints, such as exposure to negative blowback and deceptive diversionary measures, and cross-domain measures rather than just retaliation in kind. The book includes twelve twenty-first-century cyberattack case studies to draw insights into cyberdeterrence and determine the conditions under which it works most effectively. Mandel concludes by making recommendations for implementing cyberdeterrence and integrating it into broader national security policy. Cyber policy practitioners and scholars will gain valuable and current knowledge from this excellent study.